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THE POTENTIAL CONTRIBUTION OF
THE CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION
TO COMBATTING TERRORISMt
Cecil Hunt*
The Chemical Weapons Convention' (hereinafter Convention or
CWC) is an ambitious step forward in the establishment of international
disciplines and mechanisms to protect mankind against a frightful type
of weaponry. Chemical weapons can be part of a terrorist arsenal, as
evidenced in the 1995 release of sarin nerve gas in a Tokyo subway sta-
tion by the AUM Shinrikyo cult-an act that captured the attention of the
world. This paper will examine the significance of the Convention in
relation to one of the post-Cold War international security threats to be
addressed in this symposium: terrorism. It will examine features of the
CWC that could serve to counter the threat of terrorist use of chemical
weapons, but will also note the Convention's shortcomings.
The preamble to CWC states the considerations and objectives the
drafters had in mind, without a reference to terrorism. In transmitting
the CWC to the Senate for its advice and consent to ratification, Presi-
dent Clinton referred to "nonproliferation" objectives and to the
Convention's being "designed to exclude the use or threat of use of
chemical weapons, thus reflecting a significant step forward in reducing
the threat of chemical warfare." (Emphasis added.) The transmittal does
not mention terrorism. The CWC features that are noted below as hav-
ing the potential to strengthen safeguards against terrorist use of
chemical weapons cannot be said to be the product of a deliberate effort
toward that goal.
This paper will not include any extensive presentation of what the
CWC requires and how it works. There is a growing body of literature
on this subject A brief overview of the basics of the CWC should
t This paper represents the views of the author, and it is not an official statement or
interpretation of legal provisions nor of government policy.
* Deputy Chief Counsel for Export Administration, U.S. Department of Commerce.
1. The Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling,
and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction, opened for signature January 13,
1993, 32 I.L.M. 800 (1993).
2. See, e.g., WALTER KRUTZSCH AND RALF TRAPP, A COMMENTARY ON THE CHEMI-
CAL WEAPONS CONVENTION (1994); BARRY KELLMAN ET AL., MANUAL FOR NATIONAL
IMPLEMENTATION OF THE CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION (1993); Barry Kellman, Bri-
dling the International Trade of Catastrophic Weaponry, 43 AM. U.L. REV. 755 (1994);
Kevin J. Fitzgerald, Note, The Chemical Weapons Convention: Inadequate Protection from
Chemical Warfare, 20 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT'L L. J. 425 (1997); Rex J. Zedalis, New Export
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suffice as an introduction to consideration of how certain features of the
Convention can have antiterrorism utility.
The CWC prohibits the development, production, acquisition,
stockpiling, retention, and transfer of chemical weapons and their use
against anyone, including retaliatory use.' The CWC prohibits the as-
sistance, encouragement, or inducement of anyone to engage in
activities prohibited to States Parties.4 The CWC requires the declara-
tion of chemical weapons possessed by States Parties5 and provides for
internationally monitored destruction of such weapons and the elimina-
tion or conversion of chemical weapons production facilities.6 A novel
and significant aspect of the treaty structure is its extension to
"precursors" of a toxic chemical and inclusion of listed precursors in the
verification scheme to ensure that they are used only for purposes not
prohibited under the Convention
The CWC breaks new ground in what it requires of States Parties
with respect to arms control, disarmament, and nonproliferation. As the
focus of this article is on the potential impact of the treaty on actors-
"terrorists"-that are not States, it should suffice here to cite but a few
examples of how the CWC extends the scope of international commit-
ments of State Parties to restrict their own means of warfare.
Arms control. Moving beyond commitment of parties to the 1925
Geneva Protocol8 not to use chemical or biological weapons against one
another in warfare, the CWC bars any use of chemical weapons, in-
cluding use against a state that is not a party. This broad ban on use can
be viewed as a declaration by all signatory states that these are pariah
weapons.
Disarmament. Whereas the Non-Proliferation Treaty9 (hereinafter
NPT) permitted for an indefinite period the continued possession of nu-
clear weapons by States Parties who are declared nuclear weapons
states, the CWC requires all adherents to carry out within a set timetable
Controls for Chemicals on the Horizon? 30 INTL' LAWYER 141 (1996); David G. Gray,
Note, "Then the Dogs Died: the Fourth Amendment and Verification of the Chemical Weap-
ons Convention, 94 COLUM. L. REv. 567 (1994); Global Proliferation of Weapons of Mass
Destruction, Pt.l: Hearing Before the Perm. Subcomm. on Investigations of the Senate
Comm. on Gov. Aff., 104th Congr., 1st Sess. (1995).
3. Convention, supra note 1, art. I, 1 1(a).
4. Id. at art. I, 11 (d).
5. Id. at art. III, I (1)(a)(iii).
6. Id. at art. III, 1 (l)(c)(i).
7. Id. at Preamble.
8. Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating Poisonous or Other
Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, June 17, 1925, 26 U.S.T. 571.
9. Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, opened for signature July 1,
1968, 21 U.S.T. 483, 729 U.N.T.S. 161 [hereinafter NPT].
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the complete and verified destruction of all chemical weapons in their
territory or under their control.
Nonproliferation. Both the NPT and the CWC were designed to ad-
dress the situation in which the parties need to allow for benign use of
materials, technologies, and equipment that can be applied either to
weapons-related or to peaceful pursuits. The CWC moves beyond the
NPT in ways that are especially significant. Whereas the NPT has a
commitment only in general language not to assist in the acquisition of
nuclear weapons capability by a non-nuclear weapons state, the CWC
not only prohibits assistance by a State Party, it also commits the parties
to impose on persons subject to their jurisdiction a system to prevent
proliferation. That system is to encompass a means for accounting and
restricting trade in precursors.
What follows is an identification and brief assessment of features of
the CWC that could be helpful in dealing with the danger of use of
chemical weapons in terrorist activity. They are presented under six
headings which should be viewed as theses. For some of these theses
this paper can offer little support, but points, instead, to missed oppor-
tunities and to the need for further efforts.
1. Activities of Terrorism Concern are to be
Outlawed by National Legislation
Each State Party is required to apply its penal legislation to prohibit
any activity prohibited to a State Party by the Convention if undertaken
on its territory or, in conformity with international law, anywhere by a
natural person possessing that state's nationality.' ° Note the activities
that are prohibited to States Parties and consider how the enforcement
of national laws that extend these prohibitions to non-state actors could
assist in the effort to prevent terrorist use of chemical weapons.
States Parties must make it unlawful to "develop, produce, other-
wise acquire, stockpile or retain chemical weapons, or transfer, directly
or indirectly, chemical weapons to anyone."" Further, States Parties
must make it unlawful to "assist, encourage or induce, in any way, any-
one to engage in" any such prohibited activity.'2
It is important that the terms of these prohibitions are such that pre-
ventive and punitive action could be taken if preparatory activity were
uncovered that had not advanced to the point of possession of
weaponized material. First, although the basic prohibition refers to
"chemical weapons", general conspiracy and attempt provisions in most
10. See Convention, supra note 1, art. VII, 1.
11. Convention, supra note 1, art. I, 1(a).
12. Convention, supra note 1, art. I, 1 I(d).
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legal systems would permit charges to be brought and sustained on the
basis of evidence of the actor's weapons objective, even if the objective
had not been attained. Second, the "assist, encourage or induce" provi-
sion should produce penal laws that reach persons whose involvement
in a terrorist group's chemical weapons acquisition efforts is too limited
to sustain a conspiracy charge, but who can be shown to have "assisted"
with knowledge of the objective by supplying a precursor chemical,
specialized equipment, or by providing financial support.
2. Destruction of Stockpiles Will Make it More Difficult for Terrorists
to Acquire Chemical Weapons
The acquisition of existing chemical weapons clearly would provide
a terrorist group with a drastic short-cut to frightful capability in their
terrorist acts. It has been stated that some 22 countries possessed or
were believed to be trying to develop chemical weapons near the time
that the CWC was about to be negotiated.'3 Most of these countries are
now parties to the CWC, but the hold-outs include a few significant
countries: Iraq, Libya, and North Korea. Nonetheless, the States Parties
have committed themselves to forgo these weapons. In Article I, parties
agree to destroy all of their chemical weapons. Article IV states that
destruction shall begin not later than two years after the Convention
enters into force and shall finish not later than ten years after entry into
force. Article III requires States Parties to declare chemical weapons to
the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) and
to specify their precise location, aggregate quantity, and detailed in-
ventory.
Locations at which chemical weapons are stored or destroyed are
made subject to verification through on-site inspection and monitoring.'
4
States Parties must continue physical security activities at storage fa-
cilities pending the destruction of the chemical weapons that are stored
there. 5 The purpose of the systematic verification of storage facilities by
the OPCW "shall be to ensure that no undetected removal of chemical
weapons from such facilities takes place."'' 6 The Verification Annex
also states that the order of destruction of chemical weapons "takes
13. See Global Spread of Chemical and Biological Weapons: Hearings Before the Sen-
ate Comm. on Gov'tal Affairs, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 55, 57, 605, 613 (1989) (statement of
and exhibit for Elisa D. Harris) (noting the difficulties in categorizing and confirming a
country's chemical weapons status).
14. See Convention, supra note 1, art. IV, I 1-5.
15. See Convention, supra note 1, Annex on Implementation and Verification [hereinafter
Verification Annex], Part IV (A), 9.
16. Convention, supra note 1, Verification Annex, Part IV (A), 1 41.
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into account the interests of States Parties for undiminished security
during the destruction period."'7
This expression of concern for the security of chemical weapons
stockpiles pending their destruction implies that the drafters were
thinking of the risk that persons not under the control of the State Party
that had declared the weapons might attempt to acquire them. Even if
such efforts by terrorists or by non-Party states were a secondary con-
sideration in a treaty that focused on disarmament by States Parties, the
CWC provisions that are noted above can be put to good use in guarding
against diversion to terrorist use. Verification of the adequacy of physi-
cal security arrangements will properly be part of the mandate for
inspectors from the Technical Secretariat of the OPCW. The inspectors
shall have the right to install and use continuous monitoring instru-
ments.'8 If a monitoring system indicates any anomaly (which could
include attempts to circumvent storage facility security or monitoring
devices), the Technical Secretariat is required to take action, including
on-site inspection, to ascertain the situation and to assist in resolution.'9
One can envision a situation in which a well-intentioned State Party that
lacks the resources to put strong physical security measures in place
would welcome, and even solicit, the installation of monitoring devices.
The Technical Secretariat, assuming it is given the funds, could even
provide technical assistance to help the State Party enhance physical
security.20
3. The Monitoring of Sensitive Permitted Activities Can Make It More
Difficult For Terrorists To Acquire The Means
of Making Chemical Weapons
The design of the CWC had to accommodate the fact that much of
what goes into making chemical weapons can also be put to benign use.
The core of this part of the Convention is Article VI, "Activities not
prohibited under this Convention." A State Party retains the right, sub-
ject to the provisions of the Convention, to develop, produce, otherwise
17. Convention, supra note 1, Verification Annex, Part IV (A), 15.
18. See Convention, supra note 1, Verification Annex, Part III, 10.
19. See Convention, supra note 1, Verification Annex, Part III, 16.
20. It is not clear that physical security of storage facilities of weapons awaiting de-
struction is contemplated in the assistance provisions in Article X. The term "assistance"
seems to be defined with reference to protection against the use of chemical weapons, but the
references are nonexclusive, and the broad term "protective measures," coupled with the
responsibility of the Technical Secretariat to assist in the resolution of anomalies in the
monitoring of storage facilities, gives some support to reading "assistance" as including
measures to prevent the diversion of chemical weapons. Convention, supra note 1, art. IV,
1 1.
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acquire, retain, transfer, and use toxic chemicals for purposes not pro-
hibited under the Convention. Such purposes are specified in the CWC
and include industrial, agricultural, and medical use, as well as use for
protection against toxic chemicals or chemical weapons. The verifica-
tion procedures of the CWC apply to facilities involved with chemicals
listed in Schedules 1, 2, and 3, and to plant sites that produce specified
levels of certain unscheduled discrete organic chemicals. Starting with
Schedule 1, these groupings generally proceed in descending order of
toxicity or suitability for use as a weapon and in ascending order of the
extent of the non-weapons usefulness and of the quantities that will
trigger a declaration requirement and make a facility subject to system-
atic verification measures under the CWC. It is principally outside of
Schedule 1 that one finds the "precursors"; chemical reactants that take
part in the production of a toxic chemicals, including key components of
binary chemical weapons.
The CWC and related national legislation should make it more dif-
ficult for terrorists (or non-party states that might become a weapons
source for terrorists) to acquire the chemicals and equipment needed to
produce a chemical weapon. Persons properly involved with permitted
use of controlled materials will be operating in an environment that
should induce them to take great care to account for the disposition of
controlled chemicals. Those operators that exceed the threshold quanti-
ties that require declaration of a facility and subject it to systematic
inspection will realize that they may be required to allow access to in-
spectors to verify that there has been no diversion of a declared
chemical."
Transfers of Schedule 1 chemicals are made subject to a strict re-
gime. No transfer, domestic or international, may be made except for
the narrow range of applications that the treaty permits. Schedule 1
chemicals may be exported only to a State Party, and only after thirty-
days notice to the Technical Secretariat.2
As for Schedule 2 and Schedule 3 chemicals, State Parties will need
to subject the chemicals to export control in order to meet their obliga-
tions under the CWC. Beginning in April 2000, three years after entry
into force of the CWC, Schedule 2 chemicals may be traded only be-
tween State Parties.23 Schedule 3 chemicals may be exported to states
that are not parties to the CWC, but only with undertakings from the
21. See, e.g., Convention, supra note 1, Verification Annex, Part VII, 26.
22. See Convention, supra note 1, Verification Annex, Part VI, 1 1-5.
23. See Convention, supra note 1, Verification Annex, Part VII, 31.
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recipient state that they will be used only for purposes not prohibited
under the Convention.
For States Parties to implement in their laws such restrictions on the
use and disposition of scheduled chemicals is one thing. However, it is
less certain that all States Parties will have the resources and the politi-
cal will to enforce those restrictions effectively, thereby frustrating
attempts by terrorists to acquire the means to produce chemical weap-
ons. Terrorists might be able to exploit a State Party that is deficient in
enforcement capability. Therefore, one must examine the CWC features
that could possibly aid a better-equipped "watch-dog" State Party to act
against such exploitation.
4. The CWC Has A Modest Legal Assistance Provision,
But The Treaty Can Indirectly Support Law
Enforcement Cooperation and Extradition
Paragraph 2 of Article VII of the CWC reads:
Each State Party shall cooperate with other States Parties and
afford the appropriate form of legal assistance to facilitate the
implementation of the obligations under paragraph 1.5
This sole provision on legal assistance can be seen as disappoint-
ingly modest and imprecise when contrasted with provisions in some
treaties directed at terrorist activity. For example, the Hague Aircraft
Piracy Convention, requires "the greatest measure of assistance" 26 in
connection with covered criminal proceedings and contains an
"extradite or prosecute" obligation.27 There are attendant provisions re-
quiring that each Contracting State take measures as necessary to
establish its criminal jurisdiction,28 plus provisions for taking offenders
into custody.29
The modest CWC provisions on cooperation and legal assistance
should, however, be viewed in light of the political significance of the
Convention and against the background of legal assistance agreements
to which State Parties to the CWC adhere. Consider, for example, how
the CWC may interact with the 1976 European Convention on the Sup-
pression of Terrorism. That Convention requires that Contracting States
24. See Convention, supra note 1, Verification Annex, Part VIII, $ 26.
25. Convention, supra note 1, art. VII. 2.
26. Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft, signed at The
Hague on December 16, 1970, 22 U.S.T. 1641, 860 U.N.T.S. 105, art. 10 [hereinafter Air-
craft Piracy Convention].
27. Aircraft Piracy Convention, supra note 26, art. 4(2).
28. See Aircraft Piracy Convention, supra note 26, arts. 4, 7.
29. See Aircraft Piracy Convention, supra note 26, arts. 6, 8.
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afford one another "the widest measure" of mutual assistance in crimi-
nal matters involving covered offenses. Assistance may not be refused
on the sole ground that it concerns a "political offense", but the re-
quested State may refuse assistance if it has substantial grounds for
believing that the race, religion, nationality or political opinion of the
accused prompts the charges or may prejudice the position of the ac-
cused in the proceeding.3"
With the arrival of the CWC, however, it becomes less likely that
legal assistance would be refused according to this "out" in the Euro-
pean Terrorism Convention in a case involving chemical weapons
related activity. Every Party to the CWC has undertaken to outlaw,
within its jurisdiction, the acquisition, retention, transfer, or use of toxic
chemicals and their precursors except for purposes not prohibited under
the Convention. These commitments should serve to give chemical
weapons-related requests for legal assistance a presumption of legiti-
macy and to place a heavy burden on a requested State that would
challenge the request as prejudiced.
Although the CWC contains no reference to extradition, the exis-
tence of the Convention supports it. First, by fulfilling their obligation
under the CWC to extend their penal legislation to prohibited activity,
the States Parties may satisfy, regarding extradition requests between
them, any "dual criminality" requirement contained in national legisla-
tion or applicable international agreement. It is necessary to say that a
dual criminality requirement "may" be satisfied, because the use of the
term "penal" legislation in paragraph 1(a) of Article VII of the Conven-
tion was understood by the negotiators to encompass criminal, civil
and/or administrative legislation, so long as penalties are involved.3'
Section 201(a) of the United States implementing legislation provides
for both criminal and civil penalties.32
Another important consideration is the impact of the CWC on the
"political offense" basis for refusing an extradition request. Whether the
criminal actor's political motivation or the nexus of the criminal con-
duct to a political disturbance is looked to in defining the political
30. See European Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism, 15 I.L.M. 1272 (1976),
signed by 17 member states of the Council of Europe, Strasbourg, January 27, 1977, 16
I.L.M. 233 (1997), art. 8 [hereinafter European Terrorism Convention].
31. See Senate Treaty Doc. 103-21, Article-by-Article Analysis, p. 40, (accompanying
the November 20, 1993 Letter of Submittal from the Acting Secretary State to the President,
accompanying the November 23, 1993 transmittal of the CWC by the President to the Senate
for its advice and consent to ratification).
32. See Chemical Weapons Convention Implementation Act of 1998, Pub.L. 105-277,
Div.I, Title II, Subtitle A, § 201(a) adding § 229 A to Title 18 United States Code
[hereinafter the Act].
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offense exception, it can reasonably be asserted that the exception
should not apply when the crime involves activity prohibited pursuant to
the CWC, when the requesting and requested States are parties to the
CWC, they have agreed to exercise their jurisdiction to outlaw chemical
weapons related activity. These are offenses that can be objectively de-
fined. Given this, it is hard to conceive of a requested State finding that
it is in its own interest to give weight to the motive or context of a per-
son's attempt to acquire weapons which that State Party has itself given
up.
5. The CWC May Help to Establish Chemical Weapons-Related
Activity as a "Universal Offense," But Further Steps
are Needed to Provide the Basis for the
Aggressive Assertion of Jurisdiction
Over Terrorist Actors
Notwithstanding the broad participation in the CWC-as of early
1999, over 120 nations have ratified the Convention and some fifty
more have signed but not yet ratified-there remains the possibility of
the need to take enforcement action against a non-state actor that is not
a national of nor operating within the territory of a State Party. Consider
this scenario: A terrorist group operating in an Asian country that is not
a party to the CWC obtains precursor chemicals in that country and pro-
duces a chemical weapon. The United States authorities obtain evidence
of this activity and alert the government of a European party to the
CWC. The European party government then apprehends a participant in
the weapons project as that person is in transit through that European
country. What effect, if any, does the CWC have on the ability of either
that European government or the United States to punish that participant
in chemical weapons activity?
The preamble to the CWC includes the declaration that the State
Parties are-"Determined for the sake of all mankind, to exclude com-
pletely the possibility of the use of a chemical weapons ...."" The
Convention goes on to bar not only the use of chemical weapons, but
also the development or possession of such weapons. Can the broad ad-
herence to the CWC be said to mark the development and possession of
chemical weapons as "offenses recognized by the community of nations
as of universal concern"? 3 This is language used in the Restatement to
describe "universal crimes",35 as to which a state has jurisdiction to
33. Convention, supra note 1, at Preamble.
34. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
(REVISED) § 404 (Tentative Final Draft 1985) (1986).
35. Restatement, supra note 34, § 423.
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define and adjudicate with respect to conduct that has no jurisdictional
links to that state. The Restatement says that "perhaps [certain acts of]
terrorism" are recognized as universal offenses. The comment to § 404
says that there has been wide condemnation of terrorism, but it notes
that inability to agree on a definition of the offense has been an obstacle
to international agreements to punish terrorism.3 6 However, this defini-
tional difficulty is not an obstacle to characterizing as universal offenses
the chemical weapons-related' conduct that is a outlawed under the
CWC. The CWC makes irrelevant considerations that bedevil attempts
to define terrorism, for objectively defined conduct is addressed without
regard to motivation or circumstances.
It is important to note, however, that the drafters of the CWC did
not include an obligation of a State Party to take measures to establish
its jurisdiction over a suspected offender with respect to conduct occur-
ring outside of its territory. Such an obligation is found in conventions
on terrorism and air piracy, but these obligations are connected to a
"prosecute or extradite" provision, whereas the CWC, as already noted,
does not address extradition. 7 The absence of such a jurisdictional pro-
vision should not prevent the CWC from being compelling evidence of
the recognition of chemical weapons-related activity as a universal of-
fense.
Whatever the ability of the European state in the scenario to prose-
cute the accused offender under its laws, the United States would not be
able to do so if that person were apprehended in or brought to the
United States. Although international law is law of the United States, an
international offense must be defined under and the punishment estab-
lished by United States statute law before it can be prosecuted in U.S.
courts.3" In implementing the CWC, the Congress extended penal juris-
diction no further than the Convention required, reaching conduct in the
United States, conduct by or against a U.S. national, wherever occur-
ring, and conduct committed against property, wherever located, that is
owned, leased, or used by the United States.39 Jurisdiction without such
links has been provided by U.S. legislation for the universal offenses of
aircraft piracy4° and hostage taking.4' The intensity of the abhorrence of
chemical weapons is such that the Convention could have supported
36. Id., § 404 cmt. A.
37. See, e.g., Aircraft Piracy Convention, supra note 26, art. 4(2), and European Ter-
rorism Convention, supra note 30, art. 6(1).
38. See U.S. v. Hudson and Goodwin, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 32, 34 (1812).
39. See Act, supra, note 32, § 201(a).
40. See 49 U.S.C. § 46502 (b)(2).
41. See 18 U.S.C. § 1203 (b)(1)(B); see United States v. Yunis, 681 F. Supp. 896, 904
(D.D.C. 1988), aff'd, 924 F.2d 1086, 1090 (C.A.D.C. 1991).
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strong provisions with respect to jurisdiction, extradition, and legal as-
sistance. This matter merits further attention, both as to possible future
amendment of the CWC and with reference to the current negotiations
that seek to strengthen the Biological Weapons Convention of 1972.42 In
fact, the extraordinary difficulty of achieving acceptable and effective
methods for systematic verification with respect to biological weapons
and toxins could increase the importance of adding treaty provisions in
order to bring to justice non-state actors found to be involved with these
weapons.
6. Trade Restrictions Will Help to Promote Participation
in and Observance of the CWC
The CWC provisions that bar trade in controlled chemicals between
State Parties and non-parties are outlined above in section three. These
trade restrictions can have a serious impact on a non-party. There is a
high percentage of participation in the CWC among the countries in
Europe, Asia, and the Americas that are significant producers of indus-
trial chemicals. Moreover, many products that require chemicals
covered by the CWC are produced in countries that must import these
chemicals. This dependence and vulnerability 'to the cut-off of chemi-
cals needed for industrial uses will be a strong incentive for countries so
situated to become a party to the Convention.
Although each State Party undertakes never to assist anyone to en-
gage in activity prohibited under the Convention, the trade restrictions
in the CWC do not extend beyond listed chemicals. The Convention
does not reach and restrict trade in production equipment or technology,
in the absence of intent or knowledge that the equipment or technology
will be used for chemical weapons purposes. It is worth noting, how-
ever, that there is international cooperation through the Australia Group
that seeks to restrict the proliferation of chemical weapons production
capability through harmonized export controls that cover not only listed
chemicals, but also technology and key dual-use equipment.
43
The desire to avoid being cut off from trade in chemicals covered by
the CWC gives a State incentive not only to become a party, but also to
avoid sanctions for failure to comply with its obligations under the
CWC. Paragraph 2, Article XII of the Convention, "Measures to
42. Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, and Stockpiling of
Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction, opened for sig-
nature, April 10, 1972, 26 U.S.T. 583, 1015 U.N.T.S. 163.
43. See Frederick P. Waite and M. Roy Goldberg, Responsible Export Controls or
"Nets to Catch the Wind"? The Commerce Department's New U.S. Controls on Exports of
Chemical Precursors, Equipment, and Technical Data Intended to Prevent Development of
Chemical and Biological Weapons, 22 CAL. W. INT'L L.J. 193, 197-98. (1991).
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Redress a Situation and to Ensure Compliance, Including Sanctions",
provides that the Conference of State Parties may restrict or suspend
rights and privileges of a State Party that fails to fulfill a request from
the Executive Council that it take measures to redress a situation raising
problems with respect to its compliance. Thus, a State Party that persists
in ignoring its obligation under the Convention to curb prohibited trade
by persons subject to its jurisdiction could find itself the object of trade
sanctions imposed through the Convention's own machinery.
Although it seems reasonable to conclude that the CWC will make
it harder for terrorists to acquire chemical weapons, the possibility of
such acquisition remains. Opportunities for terrorists to procure or to
produce chemical weapons will exist, in part, because some States that
are believed to possess or to be seeking such weapons have not signed
the CWC and appear to be unlikely to do so in the foreseeable future.
Even if one of these States were not complicit in enabling a non-state
actor to obtain chemical weapons, the existence of a weapons stockpile
in that State would provide a tempting target. Moreover, it seems unre-
alistic to expect that non-party States will be completely deprived of the
means of producing chemical weapons. Even if a non-party State must
import precursor chemicals, it will be extremely difficult for the States
Parties to the CWC to achieve completely diversion-proof trade con-
trols.
The continuation of this residual risk makes it all the more disap-
pointing that the negotiators of the CWC missed the opportunity to do
more with respect to cooperative enforcement. There is an imbalance in
the consequences facing States and non-State actors. A state that intro-
duces the use or the threat of use of chemical weapons into the world
environment created by the broad adherence to the CWC must expect
forceful counter-measures, including military action, through the United
Nations process or otherwise. The Convention contemplates that the
Conference of State Parties will respond to serious cases by going be-
yond the suspension of CWC benefits and recommending collective
measures or by referring the case to the United Nations General Assem-
bly and Security Council.44
Non-State actors contemplating terrorist activity using chemical
weapons do not face a significantly greater risk of detection and pun-
ishment by reason of enforcement mechanisms established by the CWC.
The intensity of shared concern might have been expected to inspire the
negotiators to break new ground in fashioning treaty provisions to
44. See Convention, supra note 1, art. XII, U 3 and 4.
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strengthen enforcement of the penal provisions the State Parties were to
put in place. What we have, instead, is a "to do" list for future attention:
(1) Require State Parties to criminalize chemical weapons de-
velopment, possession or use;
(2) Establish mechanisms for cooperation in investigating pos-
sible CWC-related crimes;
(3) Have State Parties extend their jurisdiction universally;
(4) Provide for extradition, without a political offense excep-
tion.
